Back to the Balkans

Giuliano Amato

The day before the NATO Summit in Istanbul, news broke that Boris Tadic, the candidate of democratic Serbia, had convincingly won a second round of presidential elections. This dramatic victory best illustrates how the border between success and failure remains the most vulnerable in Europe. The Balkans still look like an explosive mixture of weak states, parastates and present or future protectorates struggling with great difficulty to maintain standards and make progress towards stability and European integration. We have no clear sense, moreover, as to how many quasi-states exist in the Balkans and to what extent they function. (Serbia and Montenegro, for example, constitute one country yet they boast two currencies and an internal custom and tariff system - one state or two?)

The latest eruption of violence in Kosovo led many to conclude that the region is again spiraling out of control. But Tadic's victory demonstrates that the matter is not so simple and possibly not so bleak. The truth is that the battle is not yet done. There is an urgent need to look at the situation anew but to do so through the eyes of people living in the region. In the course of its involvement in South Eastern Europe, the international community has behaved as if it had "the correct solutions" and only faced a problem in imposing these. This approach can work no longer. To do so fosters a crisis of legitimacy and facilitates the emergence of anti-Western populism. This is a recipe for disaster. The region will not be able to achieve a sustainable regime of prosperity and stability without the mechanisms of EU integration. At the same time it is clear that the dysfunctional states and protectorates, which dominate the region, are flawed as instruments for the integration the Balkans into the European mainstream. The transition from a weak State into a member State is the critical task facing Balkan societies today.

The current constitutional agreements do neither work nor are they subject to proper critically scrutiny. They lead to a state of flux, but not to a successful transition. They were negotiated to end crises - generally, armed conflicts - concerning the very right of this or that state to exist. But these constitutional arrangements have deferred and left unsolved critical questions regarding the state's capacity for effective administration, including its monopoly on policing and taxation. Furthermore, they were to an extent imposed by the international community and as a result the public views them with some mistrust.

This is most obvious in Bosnia and Kosovo where international actors retain executive power. In Bosnia, the residual grip of nationalist actors is a persistent feature. In Kosovo, the capacity of the central authorities has not been and will not be tested as long as international actors play the decisive role in decision-making. It is critical that international efforts to bolster the governing structures in the Balkans strengthen both their commitment and their transparency. The prospect of integration with the EU for this part of the continent was a taboo subject until 1999. And it was not until the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 that the Balkan States were offered a real opportunity to become members. It is vital that the people of the region grasp this fact - that despite appearances they are in transition, and not merely in flux.

For this to happen, local people must learn to feel directly involved in the transformations of society. As we have noted, the post-Yugoslav constitutions emerged from struggles over the right of Balkan states to exist. It is now time to focus on domestic processes of reform and on the process of convincing ordinary citizens of the necessity of such reforms. On the one hand, this means the restructuring of public administration and macro-economic adjustments, which will enable the state to deliver its services efficiently. On the other hand, there is an urgent need to deepen the process of democratization to secure improvements in political representation.

The countries of the Western Balkans want to be in the European Union tomorrow, but the international community is in the region today. Both the efficiency and the legitimacy of its presence will depend on how successful the EU is in turning the prospect of membership into an effective incentive for political and economic reform. The accession process rightly presupposes the existence of functioning states that are willing and able to respond to the mechanism of conditionality. This is not yet the case in the Western Balkans. This means the EU faces a critical dilemma - it should neither discourage the countries from the Western Balkans in their aspirations but nor should it lower its criteria for membership. A specific strategy is needed to overcome this dilemma and Brussels should negotiate it both with the governments and with the communities in the region. Provided we hit upon a smart strategy, we will at last manage to draw the border between failure and success in Europe.

The article appeared in the major daily newspapers of Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, in the eve of the first study tour of the International Commission on the Balkans from 14 to 17 July 2004.